The Epicureans' arguments against the fear of death have always generated a great deal of discussion and analysis. Here I detail one argument found in the third book of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura (DRN) and attempt to show that the exact form in which it appears in Lucretius' text is distinct from a related argument which is sometimes the focus of current debate. I hope that from this somewhat negative conclusion some positive In Epicurean terms, death is the disruption of the atomic complex of body and soul which constitute a person, and since no further sensation can be experienced, no pleasure and pain can be experienced and therefore no well-or ill-being in Epicurean terms. This is the argument, therefore, that in order for something to count for or against well-being there must be a subject of that well-or ill-being who stands in an appropriate relationship to the supposed good or bad.' For an Epicurean this relationship is the perception of pleasure or pain. In any case, after death there is no subject at all (just as before birth there was no subject) and therefore death can be nothing to us. If this is the force of the 'Symmetry argument', then it adds nothing significant to the major Epicurean claim about death. In fact, Fi might appear to make a weaker claim than Kyria Doxa 2, since it claims that death will not be bad, whereas Kyria Doxa 2 famously says it is nothing to us. (The verb 'to be' is omitted from the version preserved in Diogenes Laertius, but in that case it is natural to supply the present tense rather than the future. Lucretius renders it as: nil mors est ad nos at 3.830.) Why Kyria Doxa 2 should do this is a question to which we will return. For now let it be observed that the reasons for the conclusion given by the Kyria Doxa themselves are sufficient to justify only the conclusion that after death I will feel no pleasure or pain, and that therefore after death it makes no sense to talk about my well-or ill-being.
Fii, however, makes a different claim. It asserts something about our present attitudes as we look forward from the present to a point in time after death. It claims that just as when looking back we feel no distress at the thought of pre-natal non-existence, so we should in the present feel similarly about post mortem time. This offers a new dimension to the Epicurean discussion of the fear of death. Whereas Kyria Doxa 2 and Fi dealt merely with the state of affairs after death, this argument deals directly with our present attitudes during our lifetime. It reflects on to the future the retrospective attitude we supposedly have now about the time before birth, asking us to take a symmetrical prospective attitude. So Pii and Fii essentially concern our present attitudes, while Pi and Fi concern what was the case before birth and will be the case after death. Let me call the version of the argument which starts with Pi and generates Fi, version 1, and the version which starts with Pii and generates Fii, version 2. I set them out here: Version 1: Pi.
Our pre-natal non-existence was nothing to us before we were born. SYM Pre-natal non-existence is relevantly likepost mortem non-existence. Fi.
Our post mortem non-existence will be nothing to us after our death.
Version 2: Pii. Looking back from within a lifetime, our pre-natal non-existence is nothing to us. SYM Pre-natal non-existence is relevantly like post mortem non-existence. Fii.
Looking forward from within a lifetime, our post mortem non-existence is nothing to us.
II
There are at least two reasons why we might prefer Lucretius to be giving the second version of the Symmetry argument. First, as I have already suggested, version 1 concludes with little more than a restatement of the original assertion that death is annihilation and therefore since after death there is no subject, death cannot be a harm.2 Second, a criticism is sometimes levelled at the Epicureans that they ought to have produced an argument 2 Mitsis 1988, 306 n. 6 appears to disagree with Furley's 1986 assessment of the argument (see below n. 5), but in his own description of the argument at 306 expresses it clearly in the form Pi/Fi: 'We felt nothing in the time before we were born; just so, we will feel nothing when we are dead'. His general attitude throughout the article, however, is that this argument is part of an Epicurean concern to address worries about the duration of a life -and presumably this concern must be part of a prospective vision of one's lifetime from the point of view of the present. Sorabji 1983, 176 is uncertain whether Lucretius intends the 'more interesting' argument from Pii to Fii. Kamm 1993, 25 also offers version 2 as 'Lucretius' argument, distinct from 'Epicurus' argument in Kyria Doxa 2: 'Lucretius recognises that we are not disturbed much about the fact of our non-existence prior to our creation. If so, he asked, why are we so disturbed about our non-existence after death?' (my emphasis).
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along the lines of the second form of the Symmetry argument. Kyria Doxa 2, it is claimed, is fine as far as it goes, but it fails to address the primary sense in which people fear death, namely the prospective fear that in the future they will die. Whether or not after death there will be a subject to experience pleasure or pain does not matter. What does matter is what can be called the fear of mortality, or alternatively 'the prospective fear of death'. This fear can be distinguished from the fear of death addressed by Kyria Doxa 2, since it is entirely conceivable that someone might well agree that 'being dead' is neither pleasant nor painful, but nevertheless feel distress as he looks forward from some point in his life to a time when that life will cease.3 A critical reading of Kyria Doxa 2 would emphasise this error, and claim that Epicurus is wrong to state as his conclusion that 'Death is nothing to us'. He is entitled to conclude only that death will be nothing to us -precisely when we are dead. He has said nothing so far to counter the prospective fear that my life will cease at some future time. The second form of the 'Symmetry argument', of course, does address this second type of fear, since it is concerned with a present prospective attitude to future non-existence.4 In that case, in a spirit of charity we should perhaps think that the occurrences of the Symmetry argument in Lucretius provide the extra and otherwise missing element in the Epicureans' armoury against the fear of death.
Enough, then, of the alternatives. Which of them is to be found in our texts? Unfortunate as this might be for the assessment of the efficacy of Lucretius' therapy, the two texts from the DRN tend to favour the first version of the Symmetry argument (namely Pi-+Fi). At least, text A certainly offers this argument and text B probably does.
That text A offers little beyond the familiar claim that death removes a possible subject for harm has been pointed out before, but should be restated.5 The tenses of the verbs which Lucretius employs are quite clear. (3.832). The verb is clearly aorist. Lucretius might still be accused here of being loose in his expression in this line, though. We might be tempted to think that nil sensimus implies that we were there and had the potential to feel pain, but did not. But this cannot be Lucretius' claim, since the point he wishes to convey is of course not that we were present at that time and felt something other than pain, but that we were not there at all and therefore could not experience anything, a point he makes explicitly a little later (3.863-4). In any case, the period of time in question is clearly pre-natal: we did not suffer any pain then. Nothing is said about the present, nor about our present attitude to the past. Text A then goes on to invoke a symmetry between this period and the time post mortem (sic 838), and the symmetrical claim it produces about the future is clearly Fi, not Fii. Initially we might think that this does indeed describe a present attitude to pre-natal time. At first glance, the metaphor of viewing sustained in these lines might be thought to invite just this interpretation. After all, in the first line of the argument we are invited to 'look back' towards the past, and presumably the only point from which we may currently look back to the past is the present. Further, the metaphor of a mirror which these lines introduce might also point in this direction. The image is of a viewer who looks back in time at a mirror in front of him. hat is what Nature shows us as the mirrorimage of futurum tempus, and it is, of course, a blank, a reflection of nothing.... Naturally there is nothing horribile or triste (976) to be seen, because there is nothing at all to be seen.' This last remark is an overstatement. Of course, Lucretius is not denying that nothing at all happened before our birth, merely that whatever did happen, it caused us no pain.
8 Lucretius explains in his discussion of mirrors at 4.269ff. why the image in the mirror appears to be twice as far away as the viewer is from the mirror itself. We need not think that in this passage in book 3 Lucretius wishes to imply that the subject is at a temporal point half-way through his life, equidistant between birth and death, although his vision in the mirror makes it look as though he is.
474
JAMES WARREN attitudes to past and future non-existence, rather than the state of affairs at some time before or after our lifetime.9
However, despite the intuitive attraction of such an understanding, the tenses of the verbs used here suggest that in fact -and despite the metaphor of viewing -Lucretius is again offering version 1 of the Symmetry argument. Above all, the tense of fuerit (973) It is also possible to understand the metaphor of looking into a mirror in a way which is consistent with version 1 of the Symmetry argument. Rather than focusing on the relationship between the viewer, located in the present, and the period of time at which he is looking (namely a reflection of future time), we should instead focus solely on the image in the mirror. Version 1 of the Symmetry argument is not concerned with present attitudes to past and future non-existence. Rather it is concerned with the past and future absence of ills. So we could understand Lucretius to be asking us simply to look at the picture in the mirror. Is there anything to fear in it? No. But it is merely a reflection of how things will be after death. So since we are happy to accept that at that time before birth there was nothing which could cause any pain, we must agree that there will be nothing which can cause pain after death. Therefore, although Lucretius' striking image of the mirror perhaps tempts us towards version 2 of the Symmetry argument, it does not require us to think along those lines.'2 Neither of the two texts which might be offered by proponents of version 2 Just as during the government of Draco or Cleisthenes there was nothing bad at all that concerned you (because you did not exist then for it to concern you), nor will anything bad happen to you after your death (because you will not exist later for it to concem you). Just as nothing was of concern to us before birth, so nothing will concern us after death. 16 1' Lucretius also points out the irrationality of those who, while protesting that they do not fear being dead, are nevertheless concerned about the treatment of their corpse: DRN 3.870-5. Cf. Ps. P1. Axioch. 370a7-bl, where this is cast as a peritrope argument. Again, the focus is on the appropriate attitude for a state of affairs after death. ' Seneca uses similar arguments on a number of occasions, most of which also conform to my version 1 of the Symmetry argument.'7 There is, however, a related passage in Epistula Moralis 77.11 which offers a rather different perspective on these issues. nonne tibi videtur stultissimus omnium qui flevit quod ante annos mille non vixerat? aeque stultus est qui flet quod post annos mille non vivet. haec paria sunt: non eris nec fuisti; utrumque tempus alienum est.
Would you not think him an utter fool who wept because he was not alive a thousand years ago? And is he not just as much a fool who weeps because he will not be alive a thousand years from now? It is all the same; you will not be and you were not. Neither of these periods of time belongs to you. (trans. R.M. Gummere).
Rather than a single subject or addressee as in the Lucretian texts, two characters are described, one concerned with past non-existence and one with future. The tenses of the verbs used also complicate the issue, since Seneca does not maintain a strict equivalence between the two characters he is comparing. The first wept (flevit) because he had not been alive (vixerat) a thousand years previously;'8 the seconds weeps now (flet) because he will not be alive a thousand years in the future. This suggests that in this passage at least Seneca is indeed interested in retro-and prospective attitudes, but not so much in a strict symmetry between past-and futuredirected attitudes. It is therefore difficult to tell whether Seneca is indeed making a specific claim about the exact relationship between retrospective and prospective attitudes.19 What is more evident is that Seneca intends here to portray two absurd examples of regret. It is important that these two characters are weeping over the thought of not experiencing things in the very distant past and the far future.
Even those who wish to accept that death can be a harm since it robs us of goods might shrink from the claim that death robs us of goods 18 Madvig emended to: flebit quod ante annos mille non vixerit. vixerit appears in one of the codices.
'9 Cf. Rosenbaum 1989, 357: 'For Seneca, the thought is clearly directed against negative feelings about future nonexistence.' This may be so, but it remains to be explained exactly how the example of an absurd retrospective attitude is meant to be instructive.
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JAMES WARREN located a thousand years in the future. (This extreme position is a possibility, however. In Cicero's Tusculans 1.9, A. begins with the claim that both the dead and those who are going to die are miseri. It is pointed out that this would lead to the radical conclusion that everyone is always subject to eternal misery.) A more moderate position will concede that death is only a harm insofar as it robs us of time and goods we could reasonably have been expected to experience. This trades on the idea that we can reasonably expect to live a full life of perhaps eighty years or so, and so dying before this time is up robs us of something to which we should feel entitled. Such a counterfactual account of the harm of death obviously loses its force in the far future, since we cannot reasonably hope to live for a thousand years. While it might be right for a twenty-year-old to feel regret if he is assured he will die before the age of thirty, it is less plausible to claim that a Roman senator of the first century AD should have felt aggrieved at the thought that he would not participate in the millennial celebrations on 31 December 1999.20 There is considerable room between accepting that Seneca's examples of regret are absurd and the conclusion that it is absurd to weep at the thought of non-existence however near or far in the past or future that non-existence may be.2' Seneca does close this gap, and the crucial step in his argument comes in the final phrase of the section just cited: utrumque tempus alienum est. On this basis Seneca grounds his assertion that such feelings about future non-existence are not justifiable. This Stoic premise is rather stronger than the Epicurean claim that before birth and after death we 'are not', since not only do the Stoics think that before birth and after death we are not, but they also are adamant that that time does not belong to us (since our time of birth and death are fated), and therefore its absence from our lifetime cannot in any way be a loss to us.22 Those times were never ours to lose. Seneca uses the Stoic notion of fate to underline his point (77.12). 20 Cf. Striker 1988, 327. Lucretius himself emphasises that the period of post mortem non-existence will extend indefinitely far into the future, no matter when we actually die (3.1073-5).
21 Malcolm Schofield suggested to me that it might be possible to perform a soriteslike argument beginning with the acceptance that it is absurd to weep at far-future non-existence and ending with the conclusion that it is equally absurd to weep at any future non-existence. However, there is no suggestion that Seneca has such and additional move in mind. 22 These two periods of time are aliena. In some Latin Stoic texts this word describes objects which are the object of the opposite of oikei6sis (e.g. Cic Fini. 3.16: alienari). If, however, death is a complete destruction and dissolution of both body and soul (for this was the third of Socrates' conjectures) even so it is not an evil. For, according to him, there ensues a sort of insensibility and a liberation from all pain and anxiety. For just as no good can attach to us in such a state, so also can no evil; for just as the good, from its nature, can exist only in the case of that which is and has substantiality, so it is also with the evil. But in the case of that which is not, but has been removed from the sphere of being, neither of them can have any real existence. Now those who have died return to the same state in which they were before birth; therefore, as nothing was either good or evil for us before birth, even so will it be with us after death. And just as all events before our lifetime were nothing to us, even so will all events subsequent to our lifetime be nothing to us. (trans. F.C. Babbit)
The section in italics contains Plutarch's version of the 'Symmetry argument', and this again is cast in terms of version 1, not in terms of retroand prospective attitudes.
We can now add to the conclusion that there is no sign in Lucretius of a clear statement of version 2 of the Symmetry argument. We have no clear example in any other ancient source of version 2 of the Symmetry argument -of an argument concerning the symmetry of prospective and retrospective attitudes to past and future non-existence. Given the likelihood that even the texts written by non-Epicureans may have turned to
Epicurean sources to construct their arguments against the fear of death, it therefore seems very unlikely that the Epicureans themselves ever offered any such argument stressing symmetrical prospective and retrospective attitudes. In that case we can restate and stress the criticism that Epicureans omitted to give an argument against the most debilitating species of fearing death -the prospective fear of death.
IV
All is not lost so far as the Epicureans are concerned, however, since although there is an important distinction between the conclusions I have labelled Fi and Fii, they are nevertheless related. Indeed, Fi can be used as a premise in a secondary argument which then produces Fii, so long as a further premise is inserted. And that premise, while missing from Lucretius, is prominent in Epicurus' brief summary of his ethical teachings, the Letter to Menoeceus. This will allow the Epicureans to offer an argument against the prospective fear of death. Here again are the two claims.
Fi: Our post mortem non-existence will be nothing to us after our death. Fii: Looking forward from within a lifetime, our post mortem non-existence is nothing to us. Fii can be derived from Fi by using the following principle:
Whatever causes no pain when present, causes only empty distress when anticipated.25
This principle can be extracted from a section of Epicurus' letter which explicitly deduces that a fear of future non-existence is irrational since, when it comes, death is annihilation. It is worth quoting this in full. 
Letter to Menoeceus 12526
25 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.16: M.: quia, quoniam post mortem mali nihil est, ne mors quidem est malum, cui proximum tempus est post mortem, in quo mali nihil esse concedis: ita ne moriendum quidem esse malum est: id est enim, perveniendum esse ad id, quod non esse malum confitemur. 26 The combination KevoS -xratio; recurs in Epicurus' works. In the letter to Anaxarchus, quoted in Plutarch Adv. Col. 11 17A, Epicurus uses both adjectives to describe the virtues, which 'filling us with hope of rewards, are empty (KEv6;) and pointless (juat'cxa;) and bring us trouble'. The force of kenos seems to be 'empty' in the sense of irrational, or without justification -as in the Epicurean term kenodoxia, used of ill-founded beliefs which tend to cause suffering. The sense of waraioq is 'foolish' or 'vain' and when used of persons generally means that what they are doing is futile. Compare Letter to Menoeceus 127 where an imagined objector claims that it is bad to be born, but, when one is born, it is best to die as quickly as possible. Epicurus claims that if this is said with conviction, the person should immediately commit suicide. If it is said in mockery, then the person is waraiog since no one would believe him.
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So, foolish is he who says that he fears death not because it will cause pain when present but because it causes pain as a prospect. For that which when present causes no distress produces only empty pain when anticipated.27
An imagined objector says to Epicurus that he agrees with Kyria Doxa 2 that being dead is no evil. Death 'will not cause pain when it is present'. Nevertheless, he argues, this does not remove his fear since he feels distress now at its approach. Epicurus carefully distinguishes these claims with two similar verb + participle phrases (Xuiinfiei icxpxv; Xtn6i P?iXXWV), but in doing so makes clear how small is the distance to be travelled between agreement with the first, and acceptance of the second. The transformation of one phrase to the other requires two changes. The tense of the verb must switch from present to future or vice versa, while the participle must change from napctv to ?XXov or vice versa. If the verb alters from present to future, then the participle changes in the opposite direction, from one which implies 'presentness' to the prospective pleXXWv. The overall effect is to enact the confusion exhibited by the objector by making the two claims he is trying to keep so distinct as like each other as possible. Thereby Epicurus tries to point out that any pain caused by anticipating death is 'empty', since it is based on false opinions or faulty understanding and can and should easily be removed.
Of course, Epicurus is aware that there is a real distinction to be made between causing pain when present and causing pain through anticipation, and is not trying to obliterate this distinction. Rather, his concern is to show that someone trying to retain the distinction and agree to Kyria Doxa 2, cannot do so consistently. The reason for this is given in the second sentence of the quotation, which contains the principle required to pass from Fi to Fii. The argument in full is as follows:
Fi:
Our post mortem non-existence will be nothing to us after our death. . This begins not with the simple claim that one does not regret one's past non-existence, but that it is not reasonable to do so. The relevant 'backfire' argument would then therefore have to begin by showing that it is reasonable to fear future non-existence. It is perhaps worth noting that in the palingenesis argument of 3.842-62 Lucretius also (at 852-8) uses the observation that in fact we fell at present no concern for past selves to bolster his claim that we should feel no concern for future selves. For my reading of this argument see Warren 2001. a. The time of birth is essential to personal identity, whereas the time of death is merely contingent (i.e. I could not have been born earlier than I was, but could die later than I will).29 b. Within a lifetime our attitudes to past and future experiences are inevitably asymmetrical.30
The vast majority of the present literature devoted to this topic takes these two positions as starting points, and while much of interest and use has been produced which involves discussions of personal identity, and the rationality of future-biased reasoning, the discussion has drifted away from the original structure of the Epicurean argument. Indeed, if the Epicurean argument does not invoke present attitudes to past and future experiences, then the strand of objection encompassed by b. cannot strike directly at the heart of the Epicurean position, since that objection is clearly considering the attitudes of a subject from a 'temporally located perspective' to things which he did experience and will experience.3' Further, whatever conclusions are drawn about our general attitudes to past and future experiences, it remains to be seen how these are relevant to the question of whether it is rational to take a particular view about things which cannot be experienced, whether they are in the past or the future. Much of the discussion of this question is centred on the rationality or otherwise of an apparent intuitive preference for pains to be in the past and pleasures to be in the future, but the Symmetry argument, on either version, is considering not two experiences, but two absences of experience. We display equanimity with regard to pre-natal events not because, although they were distressing at the time, they are now in the past. They simply were not ever distressing to us because they happened when we did not (yet) exist. So, for example, the conclusion that we have a 'future bias' when it comes to our pleasures is not of direct relevance. The cases considered by Parfit 1984, 165-7 by which he generates an intuitive 'future bias' are different from the case of death insofar as they are cases in which pain has been or will be experienced, although the memory of this pain is subsequently removed by induced amnesia. In this case, it would appear, Epicurus would happily concede that such future painful experiences might be feared. Death, however, is not painful when it is present. Objection a., therefore, seems to have a better chance against Epicurus, since it can also strike against version 1 of the Symmetry argument. It argues that Pi (or Pii) might be true, but that this attitude cannot be transferred to the future, because attitudes about prenatal non-existence can be explained by the bare fact that a particular individual could not have been born earlier than the actual date of birth. In other words, date of birth is essential to personal identity, whereas the date of death is not. This is offered as a relevant distinction between past and future non existence.33
This objection is sometimes (as in Nagel, 1979) supplemented by a counterfactual account of the harm constituted by death. Death is an evil because it deprives one of goods which would have been enjoyed had death occurred later. But prenatal non-existence is not also an evil, because the relevant symmetrical claim about birth (namely that being born at a particular time deprives one of goods which would have been enjoyed had one been born earlier) does not express a real possibility; the comparanda ( truly thinks that when some state of affairs comes about, it will not cause any pain, it is indeed irrational nevertheless to fear in anticipation being in that state. If this person persists in fearing going to the dentist, say, then this surely must be because he thinks that when he is in the dentist's chair he will experience pain. If he knew that there would be no pain, then it does not seem rational to fear in anticipation painless dental work. This allows, of course, that one might mistakenly believe that some future state of affairs will be painful and therefore fear it in anticipation, but this simply underlines how crucial it is for Epicurus to convince us of the truth of Kyria Doxa 2.
By bridging the distance between fearing being dead and fearing future non-existence in the way I have suggested here, Epicurus can try to force the discussion back to his central claim that the state of being dead is not painful in any way (and is therefore not an evil). Perhaps this explains what might otherwise seem a strange omission on Lucretius' part, namely the lack of the further argument against the present fear of future nonexistence found in Letter to Menoeceus 125. If Epicurus saw this prospective fear as derivative from the fear of the state of being dead, and was convinced that it was on this latter fear that his attention should be concentrated, then Lucretius may well also have been so convinced that he went so far as to omit the brief argument retained in Letter to Menoeceus 125, thinking that it was merely an optional supplementary step. All his attention was directed, even in the supposed 'Symmetry arguments', towards establishing the conclusion of Kyria Doxa 2: nil mors est ad nos nec pertinet hilum,lquandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur (3.830-1). It might also be suggested that Kyria Doxa 2 itself contains an implicit use of the principle invoked in Letter to Menoeceus 125. I noted above that a critical reading would object to Epicurus' conclusion that death is nothing to us, since what follows only shows that death will be nothing to us. A more charitable reading would invoke the idea contained in Letter to Menoeceus 125 as understood within the argumentation of Kyria Doxa 2 in which physical pain is an evil is revealed as fundamentally in our fear of future pain as in our aversion to present pain ... Similarly, the sense in which death is thought of as an evil is revealed in a fundamental way in a person's fear of her own death.' This objection is related to Cockbum's general concern about a particular approach to such questions, an approach which Epicurus seems to endorse (140): '[I]f we do not think of the transformation from one tense to another as being a common operator on a range of different propositional cores we will find no incongruity in the idea that something which is a matter of complete indifference when it lies in the past should be a matter of deep concern when it lies in the future.' to generate a conclusion about how we presently should view the period of our future non-existence.
Again, however, it should be emphasised just what Epicurus has shown so far -and what he has not. The combination of Kyria Doxa 2 and the argument of Letter to Menoeceus 125 shows that the state of being dead is not to be feared even in prospect since it will not be painful. But this still does not tackle directly the fear of mortality -the fear which some critics of Epicureanism found left intact by Kyria Doxa 2. The critic might claim that by talking of a fear of death, he is not claiming to justify the fear of not-being (and so could allow Epicurus the claim in Kyria Doxa 2), but rather this fear of mortality. In other words, the fear is not based on an inconsistent dread of 'being dead', but rather in the prospective concern that one's life, plans, and projects might be curtailed prematurely.37 If this is a criticism specifically of the argument of Kyria Doxa 2, and of the Symmetry argument as I have interpreted it, then it is a reasonable one. Nothing here explicitly tackles the problem of fearing that a life will end incomplete. The critic of Epicureanism might also complain that even with the addition of the argument of Letter to Menoeceus 125, Epicurus again misses the point. He might well claim that fearing death is not at all like fearing an impending painful event -it is rather a concern with the shape and completeness of a life.
This could even be expressed in hedonistic terms, again using the counterfactual account of the harm of death. Someone might be quite happy with the conclusion that being dead is not painful, and therefore agree that they should not fear in anticipation the state of being dead (in other words, they might agree whole-heartedly with Kyria Doxa 2 and Letter to Menoeceus 125), but nevertheless feel anxious at the thought that dying at some point in time will rob them of pleasure that they would have experienced had they died at a later time. Their life might be better than it will turn out to be. Their death might be premature.38
There are good reasons to think that the Epicureans did concern themselves with the question of the completeness of a life and therefore with the question of whether and when a death can be premature. But they did this via their own particular brand of eudaimonistic hedonism, not through 37 See Striker 1988. 3X Indeed, if expressed in hedonistic terms it appears that any death, even one in advanced old age may rob me of possible pleasures. Of course, on such an account death could also be counted as a good -provided it releases me from inevitable future pains. the specific arguments surveyed here. In short, the Epicureans try to dissociate the idea of a complete life from notions of temporal duration and attempt to deny any cumulative notion of pleasures. They therefore would argue that so long as you achieve katastematic pleasure, death cannot rob you of any further good which you 'would have experienced had you died later'. They try to argue that complete pleasure can be experienced in a finite time. This is not the place to delve into or criticise this particular facet of Epicurean hedonism, but this concern to provide an Epicurean story about what constitutes a complete life should therefore be seen as the second complementary strand of reasoning in Epicurean discussions of the fear of death. Once Epicurus has reduced as much as possible of the complex of anxieties about death to the fear of being dead, and has countered these with Kyria Doxa 2 and the Symmetry argument, he can set about putting in place his own positive account of a complete life which, he hopes, is immune to fears of premature death.39
One remaining objection should be outlined. It may be argued that the attitude we normally take towards death can be justified on grounds other than its rationality, namely on its utility. While it might certainly be the case that the state of being dead involves nothing which should be feared even in prospect, nevertheless we could claim that it is best for us to try to avoid that state for as long as possible. We might even call this instrumental fear of death an evolutionary product. It is best for each individual to live for as long as possible -perhaps in order to procreate as often and successfully as possible -and one way in which this aim might be achieved is through an innate aversion to death. This fear must be kept distinct from the fear of pain, which might of itself be said to make us avoid certain potentially fatal situations. The fear in question is not the fear of dying in some particular way; it is the very general and basic aversion to ceasing to be. Epicurus, of course, would wholeheartedly endorse any mechanism which allows us to avoid pain. But still he insists that life would be better, indeed more pleasant, if we were to stop fearing death. The question here is whether specifically fearing death can be seen to serve some function such that if it were not present our lives would be rendered 4 Diogenes of Oinoanda fr. 35 Smith distinguishes two types of fearing death, one which is clear and another which is not. As an example of the first he offers the example of avoiding something harmful, a fire for example, since it might cause death. It is unclear, however, whether Diogenes wishes to endorse this as the corrett reason for avoiding fire (i.e. the reason why an Epicurean sage would avoid fire) or on what grounds a committed Epicurean could do so without jeopardising the assertion that death is 'nothing to us'. Of course, it is perfectly acceptable -and surely plausiblefor him to argue that we do and should avoid dying painfully if at all possible.
